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Increasing numbers of automotive control systems are being designed as distributed systems, with critical functions linked by electronic communications. This includes Xby-wire systems, which seek to replace mechanical or hydraulic linkages with electrical or communications links. These systems raise a number of new challenges:
• Safety is a function of the whole system rather than any one system feature. Thus, safety analysis and understanding must occur at the (complex) system level.
• A robust design process is essential to ensure that complex system issues and critical analysis occur at the right development stage and cover all appropriate parts of the system.
This article provides a case study of a development project to show how these and other issues can be addressed. We describe the development of a communications network for a safety-related engine application that consists of a central electronic control unit (ECU) and a number of distributed actuators that are controlled via the network. We apply several techniques, such as hazard and scheduling analysis, to resolve safety and reliability issues.
Development process
Our communications network is an integrated system for a family of large stationary internal combustion engines produced by Waukesha Engine in Wisconsin. Natural gas fuels the engines, which are used mainly in applications such as natural gas compression and electrical power generation. The system replaces an earlier version in which separate electronic modules from different suppliers implemented each function-torque (or speed governor), air/fuel ratio (AFR), ignition, and so on-with little intermodule communication.
We sought to combine as many functions as practical in a single ECU and replace existing control units with either simple actuators or devices of limited intelligence and lower cost. We recognized that there would be an ongoing need to expand the system at a later date, so we specified a local area network to support future devices without significantly reworking the existing system.
Network outline
We selected the controller area network 2.0B
1 protocol for the network data layer. Many automotive and industrial applications use CAN 2.0B, and inexpensive components and tools are widely available.
Initial hazard analysis
We identified hazards at the system level using the Hazard and Operability (Hazop) analysis defense standard, a technique for working with electronic programmable systems. 2, 3 Hazop was first introduced by the chemical process industry and later adopted by the UK Ministry of Defense. It is based on the systematic evaluation of some system attribute guided by a set of keywords such as "no," "more," and "less." The keywords have a generic meaning but can be redefined and applied to specific situations, including engine behavior, operating systems, scheduling, and communications protocols. 2, 3 For example, we redefined the guide word "more" to mean "duplicate" when we applied Hazop to the communications protocol.
We performed an initial hazard analysis to assess the system's safety integrity level. A system's SIL value determines the rigor of the development process. SIL values are used to classify control and protection systems into broad categories related to the consequences and probabilities of failure, or, in the case of the Motor Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA) guidelines, 4, 5 into the following controllability categories:
• The failure has a nuisance value (0).
• The failure is distracting (1).
• The failure is debilitating (2). Slave ECU Figure 1 . Overview of the control network as envisaged for scheduling and hazard analysis.
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• The failure is difficult to control (3).
• The failure results in an uncontrollable system (4).
Initially, we considered only major factors, such as fuel, air flow, ignition, and RPM, and the hazards associated with the attributes that the keywords denote. We also considered effects of mitigating devices, such as
• emergency shutdown lines for the ECU and ignition modules implemented in hardware, and • additional shielding for the turbo charger unit.
The initial hazard analysis of the engine showed an SIL of 2. Thus the system is safety related but not safety critical, as operating staff or external control equipment can effectively respond to failures.
CAN protocol
The CAN 2.0B protocol broadcasts short data packets around a localized network (or bus) such as a factory or an automobile. Traffic on the bus consists of a sequence of frames where each frame starts with an identifier that both identifies the type of data contained in the frame and prioritizes access to the bus.
In ISO layered model terminology, the CAN 2.0B protocol defines the data-link layer but not a higher-level protocol-that is, it does not define the transmitted information. We therefore had to either select an established protocol and adapt it to our requirements or develop a new protocol.
Many higher-level protocols run on top of CAN (J1939, CAN Kingdom, and Volcano, for example). None of these protocols suited our application, however. For example, J1939 provides little support for application-specific messages, and CAN Kingdom has many unnecessary features, such as hot-swap and dynamic allocation of message identifiers. We also wanted to avoid extending the network to devices we did not control (plant control devices, for instance), because we wanted to perform the most complete analysis possible of the system's behavior.
We therefore implemented our own higher-level protocol based on the Volcano system. 6 Volcano guarantees real-time performance and has no unnecessary protocol elements. With Volcano as a starting point, we designed our protocol in two stages: First, we established a set of devices; then we defined a set of messages to carry the information between devices. For devices with unspecified functionality, we based message definitions on assumptions about how the system could work and made worst-case assumptions about the amount of data to be transmitted. For example, if running an engine required two ECU devices, we assumed that the devices would have a masterslave relationship and that they would require at least one message to coordinate timing and load information. In general, if we didn't know a device's communications requirements, we defined at least one 8-byte message for communication in each direction.
Next, we determined message delivery deadlines. We based our initial analysis on the information's importance to system operation. The analysis assumes, for example, that messages must arrive before the next version is queued for transmission. It also assumes that messages containing control information are more important than messages conveying status. We also considered information generation and processing frequency, sensor and actuator reaction times, and effects of errors on the system. One issue we addressed was ignition unit feedback. The unit produces one coil discharge reading per cylinder firing, so generates discharge readings at a maximum rate of 294 Hz. Because the system processes these messages only at 40 Hz, we grouped discharge readings into sets comprising half the readings and transmitted them once per revolution, which is approximately 37 Hz at 2,200 RPM.
We have defined a total of 29 messages but currently use only 14 (or 48 percent) of them. Future expansion could require the remaining 15. Indeed, we expect to use the majority of these messages (except injector control messages) in the near future.
Message ID allocation
The CAN 2B protocol allows either 11-or 29-bit message identifiers. We used 29-bit identifiers to afford maximum flexibility at a slightly reduced bandwidth. To achieve this flexibility for future message additions, we left gaps in the priority values assigned. We deemed this necessary because we expect the system to be in production for at least a decade, and the additional messages we've defined are at best an educated guess at future requirements.
The first 11 bits of the 29-bit extended identifiers assign message priority. In general, we assigned priority in line with the heuristic rules we used to determine deadlines. The next 8 bits serve as a receive ID containing information on the device receiving each message broadcast. For example, all messages broadcast to the AFR units have the same receive ID. The next 7 bits are currently unused. The final 3 bits form a device ID, which we use when we expect several devices of the same type to be present on the network. As many as four AFR units can be present in any one system, for example.
Where we have multiple devices of the same type, we use the electrical harness to determine each device's identifier. For example, two pins that are tied either high or low in the electrical harness identify the four AFR units, so we can use identically programmed units in any position on the network.
The receive ID within the CAN identifier lets us take advantage of the message-masking feature of most CAN devices. This feature lets us configure the devices to ignore messages with identifiers that do not match specific patterns, thereby reducing the workload on the processor receiving the messages. This is an important consideration for the low-end microcontrollers used in the auxiliary control devices.
We allocated message identifiers using a spreadsheet in which each bit in the message ID was set or cleared. Macros prevent clashes and ensure the consistency of allocated values.
Scheduling analysis
Having defined the message set's functional aspects, we wanted to use the protocol to state whether messages will always be transmitted in a timely fashion. A common approach to ensuring timely transmission of CAN messages is to operate the bus at a higher bit rate than would appear necessary given a message set-typically achieving at most a 10-to 20-percent bus utilization. This is inefficient, however, because the bus must operate at higher frequencies than necessary, and it is undesirable because the timeliness of message delivery is not guaranteed and can be demonstrated only through testing.
CAN prioritization mechanism.
A better approach is to use the CAN prioritization mechanism during message identifier transmission. The CAN bus is in a wired-AND configuration with each node simultaneously driving and sampling the bus state. At any instant, the logical AND of each node's output gives the bus state. Thus, if all nodes have an output of logical 1, the bus state is 1; if any node outputs a 0, the bus state is 0.
During identifier transmission, each transmitting node arbitrates by attempting to send its highest priority message. As it transmits each bit of the message identifier, the node checks whether the bus state is the same as its output state. If the states differ, the transmitter backs off, letting the other nodes continue arbitration until they find a single winning message, which they then transmit to completion. The losing nodes let the losing CAN frames re-enter arbitration at the next opportunity.
This prioritization scheme is similar to task prioritization in real-time operating systems. The CAN bus operates as a nonpreemptive scheduler, selecting jobs on a fixed priority basis and ensuring that they are not preempted until completion. Thus, we can calculate worst-case delays for the messages using simple, well-known techniques for uniprocessor scheduling 7 (see the "Calculation of worstcase message delays" sidebar).
Scheduling calculations. The scheduling calculations require the network designer to specify bus speed (baud rate), a set of messages for the bus to transmit, and an error model characterizing the effect of noise on the bus. For message transmission, the network designer must specify message priority (the message identifier) and length, the transmission period, timing jitter in the message output, and the deadline for reaching the receiving node.
The basic scheduling calculation is simple. If a node attempts to send a message, there are only two reasons for the node not to send it: Either the bus is already busy (blocking delay) or the node loses arbitration to a higher priority message (interference delay). The sum of these delays is the total queuing delay. The worst-case blocking delay is the longest time that a lower-priority message takes to transmit on the bus (as message transmission always completes). The worst-case interference delay is the number of times higher-priority messages transmit while the message is queued. The delays are interdependent, and thus the scheduling calculation is iterative.
The calculation gives an initial queuing delay, which we feed back into the calculation until either the delay is greater than the deadline for the message (the message is not schedulable) or the delay reaches a fixed point (the worst-case delay). The calculations converge on a fixed point as long as the bus use is less than 100 percent. This technique lets the network designer verify that the proposed message set is schedulable-that is, that the system will transmit all messages within the specified deadlines.
We use a simple error model, described by Tindell and Burns, 7 that assumes we have a burst of 4 noise bits occurring at 10-millisecond intervals. As with the other parameters, we can vary values via the test file.
Analysis results. For our analyses, we used a special-purpose program written by Stephen Parker. The program received data via a test file that specified bus attributes, the error model, and message details.
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The worst-case transmission time C m for an extended CAN message is (1) where τ bit is the bit time of the physical medium, and s m is the size (in bytes) of the CAN frame's data part. Total transmission time is the sum of the worst-case number of stuff, header, and data bits. CAN requires that transmitting nodes insert a stuff bit after transmitting five equal value bits. Early work assumed that the worst case is a stuff bit inserted every five data bits; however, the inserted stuff bit is the first bit of the next sequence.
1 Thus, the sequence 00000111100001111 becomes 00000 (1)1111(0)0000(1)1111, and the result tends toward a maximum of a stuff bit for every four data bits. This detail is important as it means that the time required to transmit a message depends on the data contained in the message as well as fixed parameters such as bit rate and message size. It further demonstrates the limitations of testing to determine the real-time performance of CAN networks.
To perform scheduling analysis, we must identify several values for each message:
• C m , the worst-case transmission time;
• T m , the worst-case periodicity (the fastest transmission rate); • the deadline (the longest time between message queuing and message receipt); and • J m , the maximum jitter (the worst-case deviation from periodic transmission).
Equation 2 gives the worst-case response time for a message where w m is the queuing time:
Blocking delay B m is the maximum worst-case transmission time of any lower-priority message: (3) where lp(m) denotes the set of messages with a lower priority than message m.
The message's worst-case interference time is given by the number of times higher-priority messages can transmit while the message is blocked, where hp(m) denotes the set of messages with higher priority than message m.
The interference delay depends on itself. The longer the message is delayed, the more opportunity for high-priority messages to delay it further.
The standard method for solving this equation for w m is to turn it into an iterative calculation. Start with w m = B m and calculate a new value for w m from Equation 4 and repeat until the value converges on a worst-case interference time.
The calculation assumes that the bus is a perfect medium and is unaffected by noise. 
Calculation of worst-case message delays
In general, the deadline for each message equaled the message's maximum transmission rate. This requires a node to transmit message n -1 before placing message n in the transmission queue.
We ran three sets of analyses using three message sets:
• all possible messages (worst case), • only messages for a spark-ignited engine, and • only messages for a diesel-ignited engine.
Analysis showed that we cannot schedule the system with a communications link running at 250 kbps for any of the message sets. We can schedule all three systems at a bus rate of 500 kbps, however.
If we examine the bus usage figures for maximum traffic, we find 68 percent for the worst case and 62 percent for the other two sets (ignoring stuff bits) at 250 kbps. At 500 kbps, the figures drop to 34 and 31 percent. If we used these values as the only criteria for selection of network speed, we would have had to specify a 1,000-kbps network to meet the 10-to 20-percent utilization limit described earlier.
Using a lower bus speed should also result in better noise immunity and allow longer cable runs. This can be significant, considering that the largest engine exceeds 10 meters in length with a generator attached.
Hazard analysis
In addition to performing hazard analysis on the system as a whole, we performed a detailed analysis on the communications network. We considered nondelivery of messages due to bandwidth limitations to be a hazard, and we addressed this issue in the scheduling analysis.
At this level, we had to apply the Hazop analysis at two different points. We first analyzed the controlled subsystem to establish what, if any, hazardous states could be entered and under what conditions. Second, we analyzed the communications protocol to determine whether it could adversely affect the system and if so, where we could mitigate the defects or how we might change the protocol to avoid them. Table 1 gives the results from an example analysis for a message associated with AFR control. The main results of the hazard analysis were as follows:
• Analysis of the subsystems identified a few system tests required to verify that statements made in the Hazop were correct. For example, if we disconnect the AFR unit from the CAN network, the AFR unit does not move the actuator, and the ECU detects the absence of the AFR unit.
• Protocol analysis yielded similar results in relation to required tests. Analysis also found that for a few messages, the ECU did not gracefully handle duplicate messages. We therefore altered some message formats so the message receiver could identify duplicate messages and discard them.
Duplicate messages can occur for two reasons. First, the software can erroneously transmit a message twice. Second, in one CAN failure mode, the receiver asserts the final bit to tell the transmitter that some device has received a message. If this bit is corrupted, the transmitting node thinks the message has not been received and retransmits. 
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Testing
To validate our analysis results, we tested the system in four main stages: unit, integration, bench, and system/acceptance testing. Pi Technology in Cambridge performed the first three test phases; Waukesha Engine performed the last.
Both unit and integration testing are validation phases-that is, we determine that we built what we designed. This testing phase is reasonably straightforward, and we encountered no unexpected issues.
The bench and system/acceptance testing phases verified that we built what we wanted to build-that is, the system fit its purpose. Both test sets involved building a network with some subset of attached devices. Bench testing involved two approaches.
Initial bench testing used a CAN interface card attached to a personal computer. Specially developed programs simulated network traffic to and from a single ECU (multiple ECU operations capability is not yet required). To complement this testing, we built a small network containing the AFR control units, ignition devices, and a single ECU. Where necessary, a PC supplemented this arrangement to simulate nonexistent devices. The system both simulates worst-case network conditions and tests the network using an operational profile.
Bench testing revealed three problems. First, because we were using a 14.25-MHz crystal on the ECU, the nodes could not achieve an exact 500-kbps frequency on the CAN bus. To mitigate this problem, we allowed a large synchronization jump width; we later corrected the problem by supplying a dedicated 14-MHz crystal for the CAN chip.
Second, the AFR control units could not cope with the set of messages they were being asked to receive when the messages were transmitted at maximum rate. Thus, we had to reduce some messages' maximum transmission rates. This proved not to be a significant issue as oxygen sensors and air flow dominate the response of the control loop, so the control strategies did not require messages at the maximum transmission rate.
Finally, some network message sets were self-synchronizing in some respects. Consider the case of a status message sent by a node either in response to a command message or at a minimum transmission rate. If the command message's minimum transmission rate matches that of the status message, there is a high probability that the node will send two identical (and redundant) status messages in a small time interval. The minimum time requirement would generate one message, and the next request would generate the second. By reducing the command message's actual minimum period to below the absolute minimum allowed in scheduling analysis, we made sure that the status message generated as a response was sent instead of one generated by a time-out. T he complementary techniques used are applicable to any development project where safety is an issue. The hazard analysis, protocol design, and testing are common to all safety-related communications-based control systems. Message ID allocation and the associated scheduling analysis are perhaps less easily transferred to other network technologies, although developers should apply equivalent analyses. We created the tools and performed the analysis described in only a few days and prevented selection of a network speed that may have been found to be too slow in the near future.
Through scheduling analysis, CAN ensures that all messages will meet timing deadlines. This provides a considerable cost advantage because protocols that intrinsically offer timing guarantees (such as the time-triggered protocol, TTP) are more expensive to implement. The process does, however, contain weaknesses, such as the following, that could be significant for applications with higher SILs:
• The Hazop analysis only looks at singlepoint failures. More critical systems should thus supplement it with a technique such as fault tree analysis.
• We did not discover that message pairs self-synchronize until the final test phase. Simulating the network and its traffic would therefore have been useful. • Our protocol analysis concentrated on proving that the network could support the application's real-time requirements. The logical protocol design was simple enough that we considered formal analysis unnecessary. For a protocol with a more complex state-like behavior, formal analysis with a tool such as Spin 8 would provide early confidence in the design's correctness.
We considered aspects of system design beyond those discussed in this article. We only touched on the design and grouping of data within messages. In general, we applied Tindell and Burns' 7 principles to minimize the number of messages. Another aspect that requires further study is the electrical harness and associated connectors. For an automotive application, this issue would be more significant because of cost, reliability, and safety considerations. The connectors we used are an order of magnitude more expensive than those normally used in automotive applications; and the harnesses are run in conduit, so are not considered a problem. We have not considered mechanical faults here though they need to be taken into account. For example, the network device design can tolerate maintenance personnel pulling or standing on the devices with minimal risk of damaging connectors. 
